

ARTICLE APPEARED  
ON PAGE C7

THE WASHINGTON POST  
4 October 1981

*Jack Anderson*

## 'Winnable' A-War?

A chilling new attitude toward nuclear warfare has become perceptible in both Washington and Moscow. The Russians are bolstering their civil defenses. Secret intelligence reports warn that Kremlin leaders believe the Soviet Union can now withstand a nuclear attack. American and Soviet strategists alike have suggested that nuclear war, once unthinkable, is now possible.

Vice President George Bush, who glibly declared last year that a nuclear war was "winnable," has his counterparts in the Kremlin. One of them, unfortunately, is the Soviet civil defense chief and deputy defense minister, Gen. A.T. Atunin.

He has written that adequate preparation for nuclear survival "has become, without a doubt, one of the decisive factors ensuring the ability of the state to function in wartime, and in the final analysis, the attainment of victory."

A secret report on Soviet civil defense by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, meanwhile, spells out the difference between the Russians' preparations for a nuclear holocaust and our own.

"While similar to U.S. policy in general purpose, Soviet civil defense organization and objectives differ in essential respects," the report concludes. The primary difference is that in the Soviet Union, civil defense is under the military; in the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency is not part of the Defense Department.

The Russians' civil defense force consists of 117,000 personnel, at least 40,000 of whom are military. In time of war, they all report to the military leader in their district.

Humane considerations are secondary in the Soviet plans for a nuclear war. The most important goal is to provide a command center for the nation's leadership and promote swift recovery to come out on top in a postwar world.

"In Soviet civil defense doctrine," the report explains, "the reduction of fatalities from a large-scale nuclear exchange vies in importance with maintenance of a mobilization base for the conduct of conventional or low-level nuclear conflict. The availability of shelters for essential workers near key factories indicates the Soviets would expect military production to continue during hostilities to support operations by the armed forces."

But there is one thing we should make sure the Soviets understand: No matter how extensive a system of city bomb shelters they build, at least one-fourth of the nation's population would probably be killed in the first minutes of a nuclear war. That's about 70 million people.

The only thing that could significantly reduce the number of immediate deaths, the ACDA report says, is mass evacuation of Soviet cities. Assuming "effective evacuation of 80 percent of urban inhabitants," the immediate blast fatalities might be cut in half. But the report adds: "Although effective evacuation could halve short-term casualties, the Soviets would still suffer in excess of 50 million dead and injured resulting from 'immediate' weapon effects. If all U.S. weapons were groundburst to maximize fatalities, an additional 15 million short-term casualties would occur."

"The longer term effects of nuclear war on the survivors cannot be easily estimated," the report notes. "Undoubtedly, shortages of food and medical attention and disruption of production and distribution would further increase losses and hamper recovery efforts."

The most frightening section of the report, which was reviewed by my associate Dale Van Atta, describes the steps taken by the Soviet hierarchy for self-preservation.

"A key aspect of the Soviet civil defense program is the provision of shelters for virtually the whole of the civil and military leadership stratum," says the secret report. "The Soviet Union possesses on the order of 150 leadership protection facilities which can accommodate 110,000 people. More may exist which have not been located and identified."

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